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I. INTRODUCTION
Consider what has become a classic (albeit overused) example' of Louisi-
ana's former law of strict liability: George owns a vacant piece of property. On
the land is a tree that, unbeknownst to George, has begun to rot. George's
accident-prone neighbor, Daniel, parks his car under the rotting tree. The ailing
tree falls and demolishes Daniel's car. Under Louisiana's civilian notion of strict
liability," George was liable for the damage despite the fact that he did not know
and had no reason to know of the defect in his tree.
This well-known fact pattern is borrowed from the Louisiana Supreme
Court's landmark decision in Loescher v. Parr,' which ushered in an era of strict
liability for custodians of things under Louisiana Civil Code article 2317.'
Relying on French and Belgian interpretations of articles analogous to Article
2317, Justice Tate reversed a long line of prior jurisprudence' and imposed strict
liability on George Parr for the damage occasioned by his falling magnolia.'
The concept of strict liability embodied in Loescher would prove to be short-
lived, however. Twenty years after Justice Tate breathed the substantive life of
strict liability into Article 2317, Governor Murphy J. "Mike" Foster led the
charge to snuff out that life with his Civil Justice Reform.7 With the passage
of Act One of the First Extraordinary Session of 1996, the Louisiana Legislature
enacted Louisiana Civil Code article 2317.1.8 Proponents of Act One sought
what they hoped would be a fairer standard for determining the liability of
homeowners and businesses through the abolition of strict liability.9
This comment focuses not on the politics and policies underlying the change
in strict liability law, difficult as such issues are to divorce from the discussion
of allocation of fault. Rather, what follows is intended as a pragmatic guide for
the practitioner faced with the problems of proof presented under Article 2317.1
Copyright 1999, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
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II. APPLICABLE LAW
A. Codal Provisions
Prior to Loescher, Article 2317 was regarded as merely a transitional article,
prefacing the principles of liability laid out in Articles 23 18-2322.'" Article 2317
provides:
We are responsible, not only for the damage occasioned by our own act,
but for that which is caused by the act of persons for whom we are
answerable or of the things which we have in our custody. This,
however, is to be understood with the following modifications."
Tort reformers and the Legislature chose to abrogate the jurisprudential notion
of strict liability under Article 2317 not by altering that article, but rather by
enacting a totally new provision. " That new provision is Article 2317.1, which
provides:
The owner or custodian of a thing is answerable for damage occasioned
by its ruin, vice, or defect, only upon a showing that he knew or, in the
exercise of reasonable care, should have known of the ruin, vice or defect
which caused the damage, that the damage could have been prevented by
the exercise of reasonable care, and that he failed to exercise such
reasonable care. Nothing in this Article shall preclude the court from the
application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in an appropriate case."
The clearpurpose of this statute is to change the standard of liability imposed
on the owners and custodians of things from strict liability to negligence, a goal
that appears to have been achieved." While this change may resolve some social
and political policy questions, it raises a new set of legal questions.
B. Jurisprudential Interpretation
The process for proving liability under Article 2317 after Loescher was well-
established." The plaintiff bore the burden of proving: (1) the thing that
10. Loescher, 324 So. 2d at 448. Article 2318 deals with liability for the acts of minors.
Article 2319 deals with liability for the acts of insane persons. Article 2320 covers liability for the
acts of students, servants, or apprentices. Article 2321 concerns liability for damage caused bydomestic animals. Article 2322 governs liability for damage caused by the ruin of a builiding.
1I. La. Civ. Code art. 2317.
12. Frank L. Maraist & Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Burying Caesar: Civil Justice Reform and
the Changing Face of Louisiana Tort Law, 71 Tul. L. Rev. 339, 345 (1996).
13. La. Civ. Code art. 2317.1.
14. Maraist & Galligan, supra note 12, at 348.




caused the damage was in the care, custody, and control of the defendant; (2)
there was a vice, ruin, or defect in the thing that presented an unreasonable risk
of harm; and (3) the vice, ruin, or defect was the cause-in-fact of the plaintiff's
damages.16 The sole distinction between a negligence action and an Article
2317 strict liability action was that, in a strict liability situation, the plaintiff was
not required to prove that the defendant knew or should have known of the
defect that caused the damage.17 Evidence that the risk of harm was unknown
or not foreseeable, or that the defendant had acted with reasonable care was
irrelevant."8
Article 2317.1 can be broken down into five elements of proof. The
plaintiff must make a prima facie showing that: (1) the defendant was the owner
or custodian of the thing; (2) the plaintiff's damage was occasioned by some
ruin, vice, or defect in the thing; (3) the defendant knew, or in the exercise of
reasonable care, should have known of the ruin, vice or defect; (4) "the damage
could have been prevented by the exercise of reasonable care"; and (5) the
defendant failed to exercise reasonable care."
Clearly, the intent behind the enactment of Article 2317.1 was to impose a
negligence standard where there was once strict liability. And certainly, most of
the above elements of the prima facie case under Article 2317.1 have been
widely dealt with by the courts in other contexts.20  However, the intent to
move from a strict liability to a negligence standard does not in itself answer all
questions or solve all problems.
Specifically, what standards should apply to determine whether the plaintiff
has made a sufficient showing as to whether the defendant "knew or, in the
16. Sistler v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 558 So. 2d 1106, 1112 (La. 1990).
17. Kent v. Gulf States Util. Co., 418 So. 2d 493, 497-98 (La. 1982).
18. Entrevia v. Hood, 427 So. 2d 1146, 1148 (La. 1983).
19. Maraist & Galligan, supra note 12, at 345-48 (internal citations omitted).
20. For a general discussion of these elements of proof, see Id.
Much of the discussion of ownership and custody has centered on the distiction between those two
principles. Article 2317 required custody, not ownership, of the object causing injury. Sauage v.
Palermo, 672 So. 2d 351 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1996). The custodian of the object was thus subject to
strict liability while the mere owner was not. Id. at 354. Custody is based on the French concept
of "garde," obligating the "proprietor of a thing, or one who avails himself of it, to prevent it from
damaging others.'. Royer v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 53 F.3d 116, 119 (5th Cir. 1995). The concept
of garde embraced by Article 2317 is custody of the structure of the object itself and damages caused
by the object's structure. Ellison v. Conoco,.950 F.2d 1196, 1208 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507
U.S. 907, 113 S. Ct. 3003 (1993). While the garde jurisprudence remains viable for determining
whether or not a defendant had garde of the thing, the distinction between owner and custodian is
no'longer so important, since Article 2317.1 applies to the "owner or custodian of a thing."
Article 2317.1 also deals with damage caused by "ruin, vice, or defect" in a thing. "Ruin is a term
of art contained in article 2322 and heretofore has been reserved for determining strict liability of
owners of buildings." Maraist & Galligan, supra note 12, at 345. As used in Article 2322, "ruin"
"means the fall or collapse of a more or less substantial component of the structure." Sumner v.
Foremost Ins. Co., 417 So. 2d 1327, 1332 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982).
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exercise of reasonable care, should have known of the ruin, vice, or defect ' 2'
that injured the plaintiff? The problem for the former strict liability plaintiff in
an Article 2317.1 action is thus to determine how to go about proving that the
defendant-owner/custodian had either actual or constructive knowledge22 of the
defect that caused the plaintiff's damages. 3
Furthermore, while it seems clear that the Legislature hoped to replace
Article 2317 strict liability with a more defendant-friendly negligence standard,
did it succeed in doing so? That is, does the plain wording of Article 2317.1
lend itself to a negligence interpretation or to some other method of analysis?
While these distinctions may seem to be subtle at best, the importance of
settling these questions should not be underestimated. It is worthwhile to recall
that, in a negligence action, the plaintiff bears the burden of making a prima
facie showing on each element of his claim if he wants to avoid summaryjudgment.24 If a plaintiff fails to offer proof that the owner of a thing knew,
or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known of the defect that caused
his damage, he presumably will be thrown out of court. 25 Determining just
what sort of proof will be required in an Article 2317.1 action will be crucial for
those hoping to recover.
III. PROBLEMS OF PROOF
In order to make a prima facie case under Article 2317. 1, the plaintiff must
prove that the defendant actually knew or in the exercise of reasonable care
should have known of the defect that caused the plaintiff's damage. What
follows is a survey of various tests, methods, and statutes that have been
employed to determine whether a party "knew" or "in the exercise of reasonable
care should have known" of the existence of a given fact or facts. While the
modes of analysis discussed here might not all be easily adaptable to an Article
2317.1 action, they remain useful as indicators of how the courts deal with the
problem of proving what a party knew.
21. La. Civ. Code art. 2317.1.
22. "If one by exercise of reasonable care would have known a fact, he is deemed to have had
constructive knowledge of such fact[.]" Black's Law Dictionary 314 (6th ed. 1990).
23. Clearly, the actua/constructive knowledge question is not the only issue raised by Article
2317.1. The plaintiff must still cope with issues such as whether the ruin, vice, or defect in the
defendant's thing presented an unreasonable risk of harm. See, e.g., Sistler v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.,
558 So. 2d 1106 (La. 1990); Maraist & Galligan, supra note 4, at 333-38. The remainder of this
comment, however, will focus on the issues involved in proving either actual or constructive
knowledge of the ruin, vice, or defect that caused the damage.
24. Dan B. Dobbs and Paul T. Hayden, Torts and Compensation 93 (1997).
25. Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 966 lays out the procedure for a motion for
summary judgment. It provides, in pertinent part, that: "The judgment sought shall be rendered
forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to material fact, and that mover is





The problem associated with proving that the owner of a thing knew of the
defect that caused the plaintiff's, damage is an obvious one. Absent some
objective evidence, a defendant is unlikely to admit on cross-examination that he
knew his tree was rotten but decided not to do anything about it. A plaintiff will
presumably need to rely on something more than the defendant's honesty in
proving that the defendant had actual knowledge. The plaintiff might then rely
on circumstantial evidence of the defendant's actual knowledge, or instead,
choose to offer proof that the defendant should have known of the defect through
the exercise of reasonable care.
There might be some temptation for plaintiffs to rely on the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitux6 in place of proof of the defendant's knowledge, i.e. to argue that
the defendant must have known of the defect." However, it seems that the
appropriate role of the res ipsa loquitur analysis in the Article 2317.1 context is
to prove either that a defect existed in the defendant's thing or that the defect
caused the plaintiff's damage. In other words, the doctrine exists to allow the
inference that a defendant was somehow negligent, not to create a presumption
of knowledge. Given the existence of the more lenient "should have known"
standard in Article 2317.1, it would be inappropriate to allow a plaintiff to
substitute res ipsa loquitur for proof of the defendant's knowledge.
2. Assumption of the Risk
a. General Principles
The doctrine of assumption of the risk is an affirmative defense in tort
actions.2" Basically, the defendant attempts to prove that the plaintiff knew of
26. The last sentence of Louisiana Civil Code article 2317.1 reads: "Nothing in this Article shall
preclude the court from the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in an appropriate case."
27. Black's Law Dictionary defines res ipsa loquitur as follows: "The thing speaks for itself.
Rebuttable presumption or inference that defendant was negligent, which arises upon proof that
instrumentality causing injury was in defendant's exclusive control, and that the accident was one
which ordinarily does not happen in the absence of negligence." Black's Law Dictionary, supra note
22, at 1305.
28. The doctrine of assumption of the risk, also known as volenti non fit injuria, means
legally that a plaintiff may not recover for an injury to which he assents, i.e.. that a
person may not recover for an injury received when he voluntarily exposes himself to a
known and appreciated danger. The requirements for the defense ofvolenti non fit injuria
are that: (I) the plaintiff has knowledge of facts constituting a dangerous condition, (2)
he knows the condition is dangerous, (3) he appreciates the nature or extent ofthe danger,
and (4) he voluntarily exposes himself to the danger.
Black's Law Dictionary, supra note 22, at 123.
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the risks of his actions and consented to them. The rationale behind the defense
is that because the plaintiff was aware of the risk of injury, he consented to the
risk and has only himself to blame for the harm he has suffered.29
Since the Louisiana Supreme Court's decision in Murray v. Ramada Inns,
Inc.,3" assumption of the risk has ceased to exist as a self-contained affirmative
defense and is no longer a total bar to recovery; it now figures into the
negligence analysis as part of the apportionment of fault between the plaintiff
and the defendant.' Regardless of its new role, however, the assumption of the
risk doctrine remains useful as an illustration of the burden involved in proving
the actual knowledge possessed by a party.
In Lytell v. Hushfield, 2 the Louisiana Supreme Court articulated a standard
for determining whether a plaintiff had assumed the risks of his conduct: "It is
fundamental that, in order to assume a risk, one must knowingly and voluntarily
encounter a risk which caused him harm. Plaintiff must understand and
appreciate the risk involved and must accept the risk as well as the inherent
possibility of danger because of the risk.""
The Restatement (Second) of Torts adheres to the view that whether the
plaintiff assumed the risk "knowingly and voluntarily" is to be measured
subjectively,34 i.e., did this particular plaintiff know of and appreciate the risks
of his conduct? This subjective standard has also met with approval in Louisiana
courts."
What, then, are the implications of the requirement that actual knowledge
must be proven? The facts of Lytell and Dorrey v. LaFleur3" are illustrative.
In Lytell, an employee who had been with the shipping company for sixteen
years, was injured in an accident while he was operating a forklift with an oil
leak problem.37 The employee knew that the forklift was at least ten years old,
that it had a history of oil leaks, and that it lacked certain safety features that
might have prevented or lessened his injuries. 33 Despite the fact that the forklift
operator "was aware of the various defects in the forklift,"3" the court nonethe-
less found that the employee "did not know or understand the risk involved nor
29. Ferdinand F. Stone, Tort Doctrine § 294, In 12 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise (1977).
30. 521 So. 2d 1123 (La. 1988).
31. Id. at 1133-34.
32. 408 So. 2d 1344 (La. 1982).
33. Id. at 1348.
34. "Except where he expressly so agrees, a plaintiff does not assume a risk of harm arisingfrom the defendant's conduct unless he then knows of the existence of the risk and appreciates its
unreasonable character." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 496D (I965); see also Maraist & Galligan,
supra note 4, at 205.
.35. Lytell, 408 So. 2d at 1348-49; Dorry v. LaFleur, 399 So. 2d 559 (La. 1981); Langlois v.
Allied Chem. Corp., 258 La. 1067, 249 So. 2d 133 (La. 1971).
36. 399 So. 2d 599 (La. 1981).
37. Lytell, 408 So. 2d at 1346.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 1348.
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did he accept the risk as well as the inherent possibility of danger because of the
risk."4 The court focused on the fact that the employee had "operated this
machine for many years without injury." '
In Dorrey v. LaFleur,'2 a father was out for an evening of roller skating
with his family. 3. Rain began to fall, and the skater soon noticed two puddles
of water that had accumulated on the floor of the rink; he successfully avoided
these puddles for an hour." However, the skater did not notice a third, smaller
puddle of water that had accumulated until he slipped and fell in it."'
The court of appeal found that the skater had assumed the risk of skating
under less-than-ideal conditions; after all, the skater admitted that he had noticed
two of the puddles." Based on the facts of which the plaintiff was aware, the
lower court reasoned that he should have known of the third, injury-causing
puddle.47 The supreme court rejected this argument, however, finding that the
lower court had "erroneously incorporated in [assumption of the risk] an
objective element foreign to [assumption of the risk]."" The court noted that
it was irrelevant to assumption of the risk whether the skater should have known
of the third puddle; rather, the crucial question was whether he had actual
knowledge of the existence of the puddle that actually caused his damage."
b. Application
Because assumption of the risk is an affirmative defense, the defendant (the
party asserting that his opponent had knowledge) bears the burden of proving the
facts that illustrate that knowledge."0 If this model were applied to the
plaintiff's action under 2317.1, the plaintiff would bear the burden of proving
that the defendant had actual knowledge of the defect that caused the damage,
not merely that he should have known of the defect.
However, the use of the disjunctive in Article 2317.1 gives a plaintiff
the option of either trying to prove that the defendant had actual
40. Id. at 1348-49.
41. Id. at 1349.
42. 399 So. 2d 559 (La. 1981).
43. Id. at 560.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 561.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 562.
50. This is not to say that the plaintiff's disclaimer of knowledge or appreciation must be
taken at face value. This is a fact question. And there are some risks that every man
must be held to appreciate. There is a plain difference, however, between what one man
must have known (a finding of actual knowledge) and what one should have known (the
imposition of an objective standard of care).
Dotty, 399 So. 2d at 563 (internal citations omitted).
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knowledge of the defect or attempting to prove that the defendant should
have known of the defect through the exercise of reasonable care. Lytell
and Dory highlight the difficulties inherent in proving the actual,
subjective knowledge of a party opponent. Given this weighty burden,
there would seem to be little incentive for a plaintiff to plead the defend-
ant's actual knowledge due to the availability of the less-stringent "should
have known" standard."'
B. "In the Exercise of Reasonable Care Should Have Known"
There is ample methodology under Louisiana law for the analysis of whether
a party should have known of a fact or set of facts. Some of these standards are
referred to as constructive notice,52 while others can be categorized as simple
negligence formulas. 3
1. Contra Non Valentem
a. General Principles
It is a well-established principle of Louisiana law that prescription runs
against all persons unless legislation expressly provides otherwise. 4
Despite this fact, courts continue to rely on the doctrine of contra non
valentem agere nulla currit praescriptio5 (hereinafter contra non valentem)
to suspend the running of prescription in exceptional circumstances. 6
The doctrine of contra non valentem operates to interrupt or suspend
prescription in four instances,57 but only the fourth is important for our
purposes: When "[t]he cause of action is not known or reasonably knowable by
the plaintiff, even though his ignorance is not induced by the defendant."5" The
5i. It may still be advantageous for a plaintiff to aver that the defendant had actual knowledge
of the defect that caused plaintiff's injuries for the purpose of damages. A defendant with actual
knowledge, for example, might be considered more morally blameworthy by the jury. See Maraist
& Galligan, supra note 4, at 330 n.8.
52. See, e.g., La. &S. 9:2800.1 (1997); see infra text accompanying note 74.
53. See, e.g., the "Learned Hand Formula"; see infra text accompanying note 101.
54. La. Civ. Code art. 3467.
55. 'No prescription runs against a person unable to bring an action." Black's Law Dictionary,
supra note 22, at 327.
56. La. Civ. Code art. 3467, cmt. (d).
57. The four instances are: "(1) Some legal cause prevents the courts or their officers of taking
cognizance of the plaintiff's action; (2) Some condition coupled with the contract or connected with
the proceedings prevented the creditor from suing; (3) The debtor himself has done some act
effectually to prevent the creditor from availing himself of his cause of action; (4) The cause of
action is not known or reasonably knowable by the plaintiff, even though his ignorance is not
induced by the defendant." Kavanaugh v. Long, 698 So. 2d 730, 736 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1997), writ
denied, 719 So. 2d 67 (La. 1998).
58. • Kavanaugh, 698 So. 2d at 736.
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"reasonably knowable" language raises two important questions. First, is the
plaintiff's reasonable knowledge based on a subjective or an objective standard?
And, second, at what point are we to determine that the plaintiff should
reasonably know?
i. Subjective vs. Objective
In determining whether a cause of action was "reasonably knowable"
to the plaintiff, should the court consider the plaintiffs unique characteristics, or
hold the plaintiff to the standard of a reasonable man? Both the Legislature59
and the courts have dealt with this question in the context of legal malprac-
tice.6"
In Taussig v. Leithead, a legal malpractice plaintiff sought to defeat an
exception of prescription under the doctrine of contra non valentem.6' The
former client asserted that the court, in determining whether she reasonably
should have known of her attorney's negligent misrepresentation, should consider
factors such as her background, education, and intelligence. 2 The court
rejected this view, holding that a plaintiff is barred from asserting that her ability
to discern the existence of a cause of action is less than that possessed by a
reasonable man.63 In short, the question of what is reasonably knowable by the
plaintiff, at least in the contra non valentem context, is an objective one, based
on the ability of a reasonable man."
ii. Reasonable Knowledge
Still, a question remains: when do the facts giving rise to the cause of
,action become reasonably knowable to the reasonable man? Is the only
requirement a mere suspicion that something may be amiss, or does the doctrine
demand more?
The constructive knowledge sufficient to defeat an assertion of contra non
valentem requires "more than a mere apprehension that something might be
wrong"; a plaintiff must have facts sufficient to indicate that he has a reasonable
cause of action against the defendant.6 In other words, a plaintiff need not
have actual, subjective knowledge, but merely "information sufficient to incite
59. La. R.S. 9:5605(D) (Supp. 1999).
60. Taussig v. Leithead, 689 So. 2d 680 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1997).
61. Id. at 685-86.
62. Id. at 684.
63. Id.
64. See also Griffin v. Kinberger, 507 So. 2d 821, 823 (La. 1987) (the plaintiffs ignorance of
his cause of action must not be "willful, negligent, or unreasonable").
65. Kavanaugh v. Long, 698 So. 2d 730, 738 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1997).
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curiosity, excite attention, or put a reasonable person on guard to call for
inquiry."".
In Cordova v. Hanford Accident and Indemnity Co.,' 7 a patient
asserted the defense of contra non valentem to an exception of prescrip-
tion in a medical malpractice action. The patient underwent a vasectomy
and experienced some pain following the procedure." His problems
worsened, and plaintiff eventually suffered a complete loss of sex drive
and learned that he would lose both of his testicles.69  The court
concluded that the "[p]laintiff's failure to connect the gradual shrinkage of his
left testicle and decline of interest in sex with an operation performed ten months
previously was not" unreasonable. 0
b. Application
Given the reluctance of the courts to accept the plaintiff's personal,
subjective ignorance as a basis for the contra non valentem defense to prescrip-
tion,7 ' it seems unlikely that a defendant's assertion that he was too ignorant to
know of the defect in his thing would meet with much approval as a
defense to an Article 2317.1 action. However, the article itself does not
refer to the reasonable man; it provides that the plaintiff must show that
"the owner or custodian of [the] thing" (i.e., that defendant) "in the
exercise of reasonable care, should have known" of the defect in his
thing.
7 2
The language of the statute thus leaves open the possibility that a court could
apply the "should have known" standard subjectively. In other words, the plain
wording of the article does not seem to proscribe a defendant from arguing that
he personally should not have known of the defect in his thing because he is too
ignorant, uneducated, or inexperienced to have discovered it in the exercise of
reasonable care.
As to when the defendant in an Article 2317.1 action should have known of
the defect in his thing, the contra non valentem doctrine suggests that the
appropriate point in time would be when the defendant has facts sufficient to put
him on notice of the defect. 3
66. Anderson v. Beauregard Mem'l Hosp., 709 So. 2d 283, 285 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1998) (citing
Boyd v. B.B.C. Brown Boveri, Inc., 656 So. 2d 683, 688 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ not considered,
664 So. 2d 417 (1995)).
67. 387 So. 2d 574 (La. 1980).
68. Id. at 575.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 577.
71. See supra text accompanying note 61.
72. La. Civ. Code art. 2317.1
73. See supra text accompanying note 65.
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2. Claims Against Merchants
a. General Principles
Constructive notice is an element of proof in "slip and fall" cases against
merchants." For the purpose of merchant liability cases, a finding that the
merchant had constructive notice means that "the claimant has proven that the
condition existed for such a period of time that it would have been discovered
if the merchant had exercised reasonable care." s
The crucial factor in proving constructive notice in merchant liability cases
is a temporal one; the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the condition
existed for long enough that a defendant exercising reasonable care would have
discovered it."6 A plaintiff who fails to put on evidence as to the length of time
that the unsafe condition existed has not met his prima facie burden under the
statute."
In Delahoussaye v. Delchamps, Inc., s a shopper sued a supermarket for
injuries he allegedly suffered when he slipped on a banana peel in the store.
Standard procedure followed by the supermarket indicated that the managers
were to "[make] a perimeter walk each hour looking for hazards and other
possible problems.' 9 Evidence introduced at trial established that the banana
peel had been on the floor for only five minutes and that the supermarket
manager had inspected the aisle in question just five minutes before the
plaintiff's fall." The court rejected the shopper's claim, finding that the
merchant had no constructive knowledge of the defect."
In Barton v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,'8 a shopper alleged that he had fallen
on a wet spot on the merchant's floor on a rainy day. The trial court's findings
revealed that the accident had occurred in a high-traffic, high-risk area for a
rainy day (the front entrance to the store).83 Although the court recognized the
importance of the temporal element in proving a merchant's constructive
74. La. R.S. 9:2800.6 (1997).
75. Id. at C(i). Section 2800.6 was amended during the 1996 Civil Justice Reform to add the
language: "The presence of an employee of the merchant in the vicinity in which the condition exists
does not, alone, constitute constructive notice, unless it is shown that the employee knew, or in the
exercise of reasonable care should have known, of the condition." See 1996 La. Acts No. 8, § 1.
76. Walthall v. E-Z Serve Convenience Stores, Inc., 988 F. Supp. 996 (E.D. La. 1997), affd,
146 F.3d 868 (5th Cir. 1998).
77. La. R.S. 9:2800.6(C)(1) (1997); Diez v. Schwegmann Giant Supermarkets, Inc., 709 So.
2d 243 (La. App. I st Cir. 1998).
78. 693 So. 2d 867 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1997).
79. Id. at 869.
80. Id. at 869-70.
81. Id.
82. 704 So. 2d 361 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1997).
83. Id. at 367.
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notice," it seemed to focus more on the increased risk to shoppers due topuddles accumulating on rainy days in upholding the plaintiff's claim."
b. Application
Were these principles applied in the context of a 2317.1 action, it seems
clear that the plaintiff would bear the burden of proving that the defect in the
thing causing injury "existed for such a period of time that it would have been
discovered if the [owner or custodian] had exercised reasonable care.Y6
However, the Legislature was familiar with the language of the merchant liability
statute long prior to the passage of Act One. 7 If the Legislature had intended
to impose this temporal requirement, could it not have easily adapted the
language of the merchant liability statute into Article 2317.1? In other words,
couldn't the Legislature have included a temporal requirement in Article 2317.1?
It seems more likely that the courts would take a hybrid approach to
constructive notice, similar to the court's rationale in Barton.8" Thus, while the
length of time that the ruin, vice, or defect had existed would be a concern, so
would the gravity of the risk involved.
3. Claims Against Public Bodies
a. General Principles
Constructive notice also exists as a prerequisite to claims "against a public
entity for damages caused by the condition of things within its care and
custody."89 The definition found in the public entities statute is, however,
somewhat less explicit than that found in the statute governing merchant liability:
"Constructive notice shall mean the existence of facts which infer actual
knowledge.""
The jurisprudential analysis of Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:2800, though,
breaks down the burden of proof in public entity liability cases into elements that
sound remarkably similar to the five elements of proof involved in an Article
2317.1 action. 9' In order to prove public entity liability for a thing, a plaintiff
must establish: (1) "custody or ownership of the defective thing by the public
entity"; (2) that "the defect created an unreasonable risk of harm"; (3) "actual or
84. Id. at 364.
85. Id. at 367.
86. La. R.S. 9:2800.6 (1997).
87. The merchant liability statute was enacted in 1988, eight years prior to the 1996 tort reform.
88. See supra text accompanying note 82.
89. La. R.S. 9:2800(B) (1997).
90. La. R.S. 9:2800(C) (1997).
91. See supra text accompanying note 19.
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constructive knowledge of the defect"; (4) that the public entity failed to take
"corrective action within a reasonable time"; and (5) "causation." 92
Public entities are held to a standard of reasonable care in discovering
defects.93 In Briggs v. Hartford Insurance Co.," a motorist was injured in a
traffic accident on a state highway when she drove through an intersection
because she did not see a stop sign placed by the Louisiana Department of
Transportation and Development (DOTD). 95 The stop sign at issue was
partially obscured by foliage.96 Noting only that the obstruction was "long-
standing," the court concluded that the "DOTD failed to correct the hazardous
condition within a reasonable time."9 Relying on this temporal analysis, the
court concluded that the motorist had established that "DOTD breached its duty
to her and therefore is liable under [Louisiana Civil Code article] 2315. "9
The court's analysis suggests that the duty imposed upon the public entity
is the duty to discover and correct defects within a reasonable time. Thus, the
defendant's duty and the temporal requirement are intertwined; timing is an
element of the public entity's duty.
b. Application
Given the similarity between the elements of proof in a 2317.1 action and
those in a public entity liability action, it seems that the jurisprudential
interpretation of the public entity liability statute might provide the best guidance
on how the courts might apply and interpret the "should have known" language
in Article 2317.1. The analysis followed in Briggs suggests that an important
step for the plaintiff in an Article 2317.1 action might be showing that the defect
in the defendant's thing existed for so long that he violated his duty to exercise
reasonable care. In other words, if the defendant had exercised reasonable care,
he should have known of the ruin, vice, or defect.
As noted in the discussion of the merchant liability cases, however, it seems
that the Legislature could easily have included a temporal requirement when
drafting Article 2317.1 . However, the language of the article seems to focus
solely on whether the defendant exercised "reasonable care." Does the lack of
an express temporal requirement indicate that the Legislature intended to remove
the length of time that the defect exists from the equation? Or does it mean
92. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Dep't of Transp. and Dev., 712 So. 2d 216 (La. App. Ist Cir.
1998), writ denied, 724 So. 2d 209 (La. 1998).
93. Briggs v. Hartford Ins. Co., 532 So. 2d 1154 (La. 1988).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1155.
96. Id. at 1157.
97. Id.
98. Id. Louisiana Civil Code article 2315 provides in pertinent part: "Every act whatever of
man that causes damage to another obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it."
99. See supra text accompanying note 86.
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simply that more than the mere passage of time is required to impose liability on
the defendant owner? In other words, must the breach of some standard of care
be established in order for a plaintiff to recover? If a breach of some standard
of care is required, it seems that a standard of care must first be established.
4. The Learned Hand Formula
a. General Principles
Of course, the courts might look no further than simple negligence principles
in applying the standard of reasonable care under Article 2317.1. "Negligence
is the failure to act reasonably under the circumstances."' Under the famous
formula articulated by Judge Learned Hand in US. v. Carroll Towing Co.'0 '
(hereinafter "the Hand Formula"), "one is negligent if the burden (B) of avoiding
a risk, or package of risks, is less than the probability (P) of that risk occurring
times the gravity or severity of the anticipated harm should the risk arise
(L).', 102 In other words, "one is negligent if B < P x L."'O3
The burden involved includes not only the direct costs of avoiding harm,
such as chopping down a dead tree or fixing defective brakes; it also includes the
cost involved in discovering the existence of the defect."' A court might then
consider whether the probability of the risk is sufficient to justify the burden of
obtaining knowledge, e.g., is the risk that an outwardly healthy magnolia tree
might fall on a neighbor's car sufficient to justify forcing the tree's owner to
have it examined by an arboist every month? If so, monthly examinations by
an arborist might be the applicable standard of care for owners of magnolia trees.
b. Application
Louisiana courts have relied on the Hand Formula in assessing whether a
defendant breached his duty of care.'0 5 It is important to remember that the
more severe the harm in question, the greater the defendant's duty is to discover
and/or prevent that risk, even though the risk of its occurrence may be slight.
Conversely, the defendant has a strong duty to prevent even a remote and
relatively minor risk of harm where the cost of discovering and/or preventing
that harm is slight.
100. Maraist & Galligan. supra note 4, at 80.
101. 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947), reh g denled, 160 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1947).
102. Maraist & Galligan, supra note 4, at 81.
103. Id.
104. Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Strict Liability In Action: The Truncated Learned Hand Formula,
52 La. L. Rev. 323 (1991).
105. See, e.g., Levi v. Southwest La. Elec. Membership Coop., 542 So. 2d 1081 (La. 1989);
Washington v. Louisiana Power and Light Co., 555 So. 2d 1350 (La. 1990).
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Thus, under the Hand Formula, the defendant's duty will vary depending
upon the defect that exists in the defendant's thing, the cost of discovering and
preventing the defect, and the gravity of risk that the defect poses to the plaintiff.
IV. CONCLUSION
A. A Refresher Course in Negligence
After wading through the quagmire of principles and doctrines that make up
a freshman Torts course, it is not hard to lose sight of some basic principles.
Often lost in all the discussion of proximate cause, vicarious liability, and the
rescue doctrine is an understanding of what negligence is: "[C]onduct which
falls below a standard established by law for the protection of others against
unreasonable risk of harm."''" The standard of conduct is not based on
hindsight; rather, it is based on the reasonable alternatives available at the time
the harm occurred.'"7 Because determining the appropriate standard of care for
each particular harm is often a situational decision, it is frequently difficult to
reduce negligence analysis to simple, definite rules.'0 8
This return to basic negligence principles seems appropriate in light of the
apparent similarity between the language used in describing constructive
notice'09 and the language of Article 2317.1, which purportedly establishes a
negligence standard."* The "knew or, in the exercise of reasonable care,
should have known"'" language at issue here raises two questions. First, does
this language really establish a negligence standard, or is the new requirement
really just constructive notice? And, second, does it really matter?
B. George and Daniel Revisited
George and Daniel might be able to help resolve these questions. Recall that
George owns a sprawling magnolia tree, under which his accident-prone neighbor
Daniel likes to park his car. In keeping with the now-hackneyed hypothetical,
consider again that George's tree falls over, demolishing Daniel's automobile.
Consider further that there is nothing outwardly wrong with the tree. Finally,
suppose that there is a well-established standard of care for magnolia trees:
owners of magnolia trees should have them examined by an arborist once per
106. W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § I, at 170 (5th ed. 1984).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 173.
109. See supra text accompanying note 74.
110. See William E. Crawford, "The Revision of Tort Law by the Extraordinary Session of
1996," at La. Code Civ. P. ch. 3, § 3: "C.C. art. 2317.1 modifies C.C. art. 2317 by changing the
requirement for liability under the article from strict liability to negligence."
Ill. La. Civ. Code art. 2317.1.
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month. George, of course, has failed to comply with this standard. From a
liability perspective, how should the court handle this case under Article 2317.1 ?
I. Constructive Notice
It seems that George might escape liability, depending on a few factors.
Given the strong temporal nature of constructive notice analysis, the length of
time that the defect that caused the tree to fall existed would be important. If
the problem has existed for a sufficient length of time, the courts seem willing
to accept that the owner of the thing ought to have discovered it."2
The problem, however, would arise where the defect has not been a long-
standing one. If, as the hypothetical assumes, there have been no outward signs
of the defect in the tree, how can George be held liable for its fall? Constructive
notice operates to impose liability where facts sufficient to put George on notice
of the defect in his tree have existed long enough that he should have discovered
the defect through the exercise of reasonable care. In other words, after
sufficient indicators have existed for a certain time, we are willing to impute
knowledge of the defect to George.
2. Negligence
The resolution of the liability question under a negligence standard would
seem to depend upon just what the standard of reasonable care is for owners of
magnolia trees, and whether that standard was followed. Here, the hypothetical
standard of care for the tree is a monthly examination by an arborist. With no
outward sign of decay in the tree, the resolution of the question seems clear: if
George has followed his duty to have the tree examined monthly, he has not
been negligent and is not liable; if he has not done so, he is liable. To put it in
terms of Article 2317.1, George, in the exercise of reasonable care (the monthly
tree examination) should know of the vice, ruin, or defect (the problem with the
tree). If George follows this standard of reasonable care and discovers no defect,
how can he be held liable?
The implication here should not be taken lightly. As the hypothetical
illustrates, there are clearly circumstances under which George might be found
liable for the tree's fall under a negligence standard but not under a constructive
notice standard, and vice versa. It also seems clear that the words of the article
call for some standard of reasonable care to be followed.
The question, then, is how is this standard to be established? Should the
courts use an ad hoc situational analysis such as the Hand Formula to evaluate
each particular risk in terms of probability and gravity of harm to each particular
plaintiff? Should they fall back on a constructive notice-type standard, based
more on a time element? Or, must the courts develop a whole new body of law
112. See Briggs, supra note 94, and accompanying text.
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laying out the standards of care for owners of a plethora of things, from trees to
cars to golf clubs?
Obviously, each of these options has a down-side. The Hand Formula
sounds appealingly scientific, but it gives little practical guidance to prospective
defendants as to how they should act in various situations. There would be far
more guidance for defendants were the courts to craft standards of care for
different types of things, but such standards could take years to develop. A
constructive notice standard seems simple to apply but seems not to comport with
the pure negligence standard that politicians (and the public) had their hearts set
on.
How the question of the applicable standard is resolved with respect to
George and Daniel really is not that important. What is important is that
scholars, practitioners, and the courts recognize that Article 2317.1 leaves
lingering questions that will require careful and considered resolutions.
Joseph E. Lee III

